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Review Essay
On Lewis Sorley’s Westmoreland:
The General Who Lost Vietnam
Gregory A. Daddis

S

Courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt

tudying the individual commander’s role in war has
been a staple of military history since Homer’s epic the
Iliad. Biographies of Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great,
and Napoleon have long enticed audiences with explorations of how great captains won or lost battles, and thus
wars, in near single-handed fashion. Good biographies, of
course, must be written with balance in mind. Events, and
the environments in which they unfold, shape individuals, influence decisions, and often circumscribe actions.
Boston: Houghton
Context matters. Of writing biographies, John Lewis
Mifflin Harcourt,
Gaddis
observes that “it’s a little like riding a unicycle: you
2011
need
to
be aware all the time of a wider horizon, even as
416 pages
you concentrate on the single problematic point at which
$30.00
the rubber meets the road.”1 Gaddis’s point is significant
for it helps explain the ultimate disappointment with
Lewis Sorley’s new biography on William C. Westmoreland. In losing sight of
the wider horizon, Dr. Sorley has reduced the history of the Vietnam War into a
competition over the merits of two individual commanders, one of whom, in his
view, won the war, the other who lost it.2
Certainly, the purpose of this new biography is well-founded as Sorley
argues that until we understand Westmoreland, “we will never understand fully
what happened to us in Vietnam, or why.”3 Philosophically, this work is an
effort to keep the individual at the center of the Vietnam War, especially during
the crucial years of American military escalation from 1964 to 1968. Sorley
tells a tragic tale in which one man, fueled by ambition and promoted above his
abilities, lost the war in Vietnam and then spent his remaining days absorbed
in sad attempts to defend his record while leading the US Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV).
While there is much to debate philosophically over the contention that
individuals win or lose modern wars, methodological problems eventually derail
Sorley from offering a fuller understanding of the Vietnam War. In focusing narrowly on Westmoreland, Sorley omits crucial elements of the conflict’s history,
especially those at cross-purposes with his thesis that Westmoreland’s inability
to understand the war had “gravely damaged” American efforts in Southeast
Asia.4 Rather than evaluate the relationships between the political, strategic, and
Colonel Gregory A. Daddis, Academy Professor, Department of History, United
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tactical levels—which Colin S. Gray notes are “not so neatly hierarchical”—
Sorley instead concentrates on Westmoreland as a failed military commander.5
At times, this is useful, for the MACV chief played a significant role in the introduction of American ground forces to Vietnam, and, more importantly, in how
they were employed against both regular formations of the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and irregular forces of the southern National Liberation Front
(NLF). Westmoreland’s role in shaping an ultimately unsuccessful strategy in
Vietnam is worth exploring.
It is thus tempting to view Westmoreland as a tragic figure and early on
Sorley establishes his antihero as a paragon of military excellence. The former
West Point first captain excelled as a battalion commander in World War II—his
field artillerymen nicknamed him “Superman.” He later gained wide respect
commanding a parachute infantry regiment, while subsequent commendable
service in the Pentagon and as commander of the 101st Airborne Division
marked Westmoreland as a rising star who found patronage from senior officers
like Maxwell Taylor. Assignments as a student at Harvard Business School and
as Superintendent of the US Military Academy served to enhance the development of a leader whose “concern for the well-being of his soldiers was genuine
and almost without limit.”6 Marriage to Katherine “Kitsy” Van Deusen equally
helped “humanize” a formal, if not humorless, general. Westmoreland’s professional maturation, therefore, suggested an officer well-suited for higher levels
of responsibility.
In reality, Sorley employs the chronicling of Westmoreland’s rise to
MACV command as an artifice for bolstering his allegation of a man promoted
beyond his means. For instance, a former aide-de-camp, interviewed in 2006,
judged division command to be Westmoreland’s best role. (Similar condemnations come mainly from interviews Sorley conducted in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, raising questions about the veracity of selective oral histories and
how soldiers remember war.)7 For the remainder of the work, Sorley presents
his subject as fueled by ambition, ignorant of revolutionary warfare—as well
as his personal limitations—and presiding over a strategy which doomed the
United States to failure. Little room is made for countervailing views, such as
those from General Bruce Palmer Jr. who recalled Westmoreland as “thoughtful, sensitive, and very shrewd.”8 In a bit of irony, Sorley notes that en route to
Vietnam in mid-1964, the presumptive MACV commander received “plenty of
advice,” with one retired officer warning him not to be made “a scapegoat for a
situation for which there may be no solution.”9 In this narrative, a scapegoat is
exactly what Westmoreland becomes.
Central to caricaturing Westmoreland as a man promoted above his ability is Sorley’s tendentious rendering of American strategy in Vietnam: given
wide latitude in determining how to run the war, Westmoreland independently
developed a campaign plan centered on killing the enemy at the expense of all
other missions. Such an account, however, fails to acknowledge not only the
compartmentalized nature of the war in which the ground campaign was but one
part of a larger whole, but also the concurrence of Westmoreland’s superiors.
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Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief Pacific, considered MACV
strategy to be “both well conceived and entirely appropriate to the ground-battle
conditions under which [Westmoreland] was compelled to fight.”10 National
security advisor McGeorge Bundy equally wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson
in early 1965 that the MACV commander and his subordinates, though thinking
first of military programs, had been “imaginative and understanding about the
importance of other aspects.”11 Rather than exploring the complexities of creating and implementing a strategy for a complex war, Sorley instead relies on the
well-worn tropes of “attrition” and “search-and-destroy.” Recent scholarship
suggests more work is to be done here, as evidenced by Eric Bergerud’s contention that such labels are unsatisfactory.12 In reality, Sorley leaves much out of
these important chapters on Westmoreland’s role in Vietnam. He evades how
enemy activities influenced the development of US strategy and fails to detail
the nonmilitary aspects of Westmoreland’s three-phase concept of operations.
A more careful review of archival material evokes an officer who understood
the political-military interrelationships of the war in Vietnam. “Probably the
fundamental issue is the question of the coordination of mission activities in
Saigon,” the MACV commander opined in early 1966. “It is abundantly clear
that all political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be
completely integrated in order to attain any kind of success in a country which
has been greatly weakened by prolonged conflict and is under increasing pressure by large military and subversive forces.”13 Far from being an officer ignorant
of unconventional warfare, Westmoreland considered the issues of land reform,
improving the South Vietnamese armed forces, limiting civilian casualties, and
facilitating country-wide population security essential objectives.14
Sorley further dismisses the fact that policymakers and military commanders negotiated strategy in Vietnam throughout the war. Determined to paint
Westmoreland as a military dullard, Sorley makes little mention of American
pacification efforts from 1964-1968. In what only can be described as willful
omission, the author ignores completely the Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS represented the single most
important managerial innovation during the war and Westmoreland’s support
played a decisive role in the organization’s inception and survival.15 MACV’s
chief placed command emphasis on revolutionary development and civic action
programs and noted in his strategic guidance for 1967 that the pacification effort
should “properly dovetail the military and civil programs.”16 Sorley, however,
turns a blind eye to this and, worse, to his own experiences. In November 1967,
then Major Sorley published an article in Military Review on revolutionary development and community-level programs which, while “Vietnamese in concept
and execution,” were being “supported and encouraged by the United States.”17
Such awkward truths, however, receive no attention in Sorley’s biography.
Instead, in this account, Westmoreland missed an opportunity to reconsider his misguided strategy by shelving the 1966 report titled, “A Program for the
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN). Sorley,
though, does not tackle Andrew Birtle’s counterargument that there “was much
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less disagreement between Westmoreland and the study’s authors than many
commentators have implied.”18 Alternatively, the focus remains on body counts,
inflating progress reports, and deceptively miscalculating enemy numbers. This
“order of battle” controversy would lead Westmoreland to a defamation lawsuit
against CBS News in the early 1980s and continues to offer worthwhile insight
into the difficulties of assessing the differences between enemy main force units,
self-defense forces, and part-time guerrillas. Sorley, however, prefers to use the
controversy for exposing Westmoreland’s character flaws. A general, under
pressure to report progress, lied about enemy strength to make the war effort
look better. If this charge was fully true, there would have been a conspiracy of
great magnitude involving West Point classmates Creighton Abrams and Bruce
Palmer. If the MACV commander was lying about the enemy’s order of battle,
why did not one of his peers publicly expose the deceit?19
The reader is left with an equally disingenuous accounting of Westmoreland’s relationship with the South Vietnamese army (ARVN). Sorley
employs a chapter on M16 rifles to “definitively” illustrate “Westmoreland’s
neglect of the South Vietnamese armed forces.” He argues that MACV’s indifference towards ARVN’s improvement and modernization resulted in “wasted
years” when the “South Vietnamese could have been developing in terms
of leadership, combat operations experience, and skill in the use of modern
weaponry.”20 As with so much in this biography, obscuration of contradictory
evidence lies at the heart of such a contention. For example, Sorley neglects the
work of Robert K. Brigham who argues persuasively that many ARVN soldiers
“were ambivalent about service in the army because of the lack of proper ideological training and the recognition that the RVN was not a legitimate political
entity with a cultural or historical precedent in Vietnam, two requirements for
a viable future.”21 Sorley also conveniently avoids the 1967 creation of mobile
advisory teams, a concept which, according to the official army historian on
ARVN training, was “hailed as the turning point in improving the effectiveness
of the territorial forces.”22 Similar to the order of battle controversy, MACV’s
conception and implementation of ARVN training and modernization programs
remains relevant for contemporary officers. Such officers, though, should be
wary of Sorley’s partial accounting.
The ARVN, in fact, all but disappears from the biography during the
climactic 1968 Tet offensive. So do all Vietnamese. Sorley takes no notice
of the enemy’s strategy on the eve of Tet—or in the rest of the work, leaving
Westmoreland fighting a vague apparition which only rarely forms into discernible view.23 ARVN generals are employed simply to demonstrate that Tet had
surprised Westmoreland. Left unmentioned is how the strain of American escalation shaped Hanoi’s strategic conceptions in mid-1967 and helped instigate the
early 1968 offensive. So, too, is the political and military aftermath, the role of
ARVN, and how Creighton Abrams profited from NLF reversals during Tet.
Journalist Peter Braestrup offered a more balanced treatment as early as 1969.
“When he left Saigon last June, Westmoreland bequeathed to Abrams an apparently weakened foe, a vast logistics network to give U.S. forces mobility and
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firepower, and a growing South Vietnamese Army which, to the private surprise
of its own leaders, had held up rather well at Tet.”24According to Sorley, when
Westmoreland did leave Vietnam in 1968, he did so as a man preoccupied with
salvaging his own reputation. Instead of focusing on the myriad duties of the
army’s chief of staff, Westmoreland crossed the country justifying his actions
to a war-weary public. In this telling, Richard Nixon, seeing the failed commander as a political liability, never once solicited the general’s views as the war
in Vietnam wound down. Recently declassified documents suggest otherwise.
National security advisor Henry Kissinger actually sought Westmoreland’s
counsel on the 1971 Laotian incursion and in early April personally called to
apologize for not following it.25 Certainly, Westmoreland was not a key player in
developing strategy during the war’s final years. Yet to dismiss his post-Vietnam
life as nothing more than “miserable” seems an unfair oversimplification.26
In the end, Sorley’s biography stands as an incomplete view of Westmoreland and thus of the Vietnam War. Westmoreland certainly was a flawed
man, but his biographer’s refusal to confront countervailing arguments suggests
an underlying agenda aimed at condemning one general in order to lionize
another.27 By painting William Westmoreland as duplicitous, conniving, and
self-promotional at all costs, Sorley can strengthen his own past work arguing
that Creighton Abrams had fought a better war. In the process, however, this
partisan work languishes in overly reductive analysis.
There is, of course, much to learn about how a senior American officer
dealt with the war in Vietnam during the mid-1960s, but Sorley’s preoccupation with bolstering Abrams at Westmoreland’s expense is both misleading
and mean-spirited. Individuals do matter but so too does context. No single
individual, not even Ho Chi Minh, should be saddled with the sole blame for
either the causes or outcome of such a complex war as Vietnam. As John Lewis
Gaddis warned in The Landscape of History, it is somewhat “irresponsible to
seek to isolate . . . single causes for complex events.”28 Philosophically, readers
of this work should consider how much impact individual generals can have
in determining the outcome of modern wars. Methodologically, those same
readers should contemplate how history can change depending on what gets left
out of the story. If Creighton Abrams deserved a better war, certainly William
Westmoreland deserves a more complete biography.
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